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What is probability?
- Give an example and ask what it means that an event has probability
`p'.
- Frequentist definition of probability. An event has a probability
if the long run relative frequency of the event approaches
when a large
number of identical, independent trial is repeated. The problem
with this definition of probability is that in many cases,
it is impossible or impractical to examine a large
number of independent idential trials. For example,
how would you determine the probability of a nuclear
reactor failing?
- Model definition of Probability. In some cases,
probabilities can be derived by developing a model - a theoretical
constuct that approximates reality. For example,
in models where all outcomes are equally likely, the probability
is simply defined as a 1/number of outcomes. For example,
in flipping a coin, one model may postulate that both
sides are equally likely to occur; hence the probability
of a head is defined a 1/2. In determining the sex of an
unborn child, the model may postulate that both genders
are equally likely and hence the probability of a girl
is defined a 1/2. The real danger is that your model
may be wrong - for example, in actual fact, the probability
of a girl in a birth is only .48.
- Subjective probability In some cases,
probabilities are assigned on the basis of prior
belief in certain outcomes. For example,
what is the probability that the you will pass
this course? In this case, the concept of a large
number of identical trials is meaningles; the idea
of a model is silly. The number that you select
is based on your subjective knowledge of your
ability and how much you plan to study. Clearly
the problem with subjective probabilities is that
two people may assign quite different probabilities
to the same event and there is no objective way
of defending either position. Subjective probabilities
are quite common - for example whenever someone declares
that the chances of something happening are 1 in a million,
they are using a subjective assessment of probabiity.
The law of large numbers and the lawless of small numbers.
The Law of Large Numbers simply states that in a large number
of trials, the observed frequencey of events will be close
to the theoretical probability.
For example, in a large number of flips of a fair coin, the
proportion of heads should be close to .50.
The Lawless of Small Numbers simply states that in the above
law, a ``large number'' is LARGE!
These two concepts are intuively understood by many people,
but they fail to understand just how large is LARGE. For
example, in the gamblers fallacy, the gambler will observe
that in the last 10 flips of a coin, 8 heads occured. The person
will argue ``Therefore
in order for the probabilities to even out, the chances
of a head must be less on the next few flips.''
Unfortunately, while it is true that the number of
heads will be less than .50 in remainin flips, this
is over millions, and millions, and millions, and
millions, and millions, and millions, and millions,
and millions, and millions,
and millions, and millions,
and millions, and millions,
and millions, and millions,
and millions, and millions,
and millions, and millions,
and millions, and millions,
and millions, and millions,
and millions, and millions,
and millions, and millions,
and millions, and millions,
and millions, and millions,
and millions, and millions,
and millions, and millions,
and millions, and millions of next flips (you get the idea!)
The Law of Large Numbers simply states that in the LONG RUN,
and the LONG RUN is very long indeed, the observed
occurances will come close to the true probabilities,
but say nothing about what can happen in the short run.
In general, sample statistics give information about data already
collected while probability has information about future events
from the entire population. Remember the alliteration `Statistics
are for Samples; Probability is for Populations'.
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Copyright 2008: Carl J. Schwarz cschwarz@stat.sfu.ca